The DNA Binding Properties of the Parsley bZIP Transcription Factor CPRF4a Are Regulated by Light

The common plant regulatory factors (CPRFs) from parsley are transcription factors with a basic leucine zipper motif that bind to cis-regulatory elements frequently found in promoters of light-regulated genes. Recent studies have revealed that certain CPRF proteins are regulated in response to light by changes in their expression level and in their intracellular localization. Here, we describe an additional mechanism contributing to the light-dependent regulation of CPRF proteins. We show that the DNA binding activity of the factor CPRF4a is modulated in a phosphorylation-dependent manner and that cytosolic components are involved in the regulation of this process. Moreover, we have identified a cytosolic kinase responsible for CPRF4a phosphorylation. Modification of recombinant CPRF4a by this kinase, however, is insufficient to cause a full activation of the factor, suggesting that additional modifications are required. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the DNA binding activity of the factor is modified upon light treatment. The results of additional irradiation experiments suggest that this photoresponse is controlled by different photoreceptor systems. We discuss the possible role of CPRF4a in light signal transduction as well as the emerging regulatory network controlling CPRF activities in parsley

German Bad Bank Plan: Government Should Take Over Toxic Assets at Zero Cost

With Germany's banking sector still suffering from the effects of the financial crisis, public discussion of plans to place toxic assets in one or more bad banks has gained steam in recent weeks. The following paper presents a bad bank plan from the German Institute for Economic Research. The key element of the plan is the valuation of troubled assets at their current market value - assets with no market would thus be valued at zero. The current shareholders will cover the losses arising from the depreciation reserve in the amount of the difference of the toxic assets' current book value and their market value. Under the plan, the government would bear responsibility for the management and future resale of toxic assets at its own cost and recapitalize the good bank by taking an equity stake in it. In extreme cases, this would mean a takeover of the bank by the government. The risk to taxpayers from this investment would be acceptable, however, once the banks are freed from toxic assets. A clear emphasis that the government stake is temporary would also be necessary. The government would cover the bad bank's losses, while profits would be distributed to the distressed bank's current shareholders. The plan is viable independent of whether the government decides to have one centralized bad bank or to establish a separate bad bank for each systemically relevant banking institute. Under the terms of the plan, bad banks and nationalization are not alternatives but rather two sides of the same coin. This plan effectively addresses three key challenges. It provides for the transparent removal of toxic assets and gives the banks a fresh start. At the same time, it offers the chance to keep the cost to taxpayers low. In addition, the risk of moral hazard is curtailed.Financial crisis, Bad bank, Recapitalization

Bad Bank(s) and Recapitalization of the Banking Sector

With banking sectors worldwide still suffering from the effects of the financial crisis, public discussion of plans to place toxic assets in one or more bad banks has gained steam in recent weeks. The following paper presents a plan how governments can efficiently relieve ailing banks from toxic assets by transferring these assets into a publicly sponsored work-out unit, a so-called bad bank. The key element of the plan is the valuation of troubled assets at their current market value - assets with no market would thus be valued at zero. The current shareholders will cover the losses arising from the depreciation reserve in the amount of the difference of the toxic assets' current book value and their market value. Under the plan, the government would bear responsibility for the management and future resale of toxic assets at its own cost and recapitalize the good bank by taking an equity stake in it. In extreme cases, this would mean a takeover of the bank by the government. The risk to taxpayers from this investment would be acceptable, however, once the banks are freed from toxic assets. A clear emphasis that the government stake is temporary would also be necessary. The government would cover the bad bank's losses, while profits would be distributed to the distressed bank's current shareholders. The plan is viable independent of whether the government decides to have one centralized bad bank or to establish a separate bad bank for each systemically relevant banking institute. Under the terms of the plan, bad banks and nationalization are not alternatives but rather two sides of the same coin. This plan effectively addresses three key challenges. It provides for the transparent removal of toxic assets and gives the banks a fresh start. At the same time, it offers the chance to keep the cost to taxpayers low. In addition, the risk of moral hazard is curtailed. The comparison of the proposed design with the bad bank plan of the German government reveals some shortcomings of the latter plan that may threaten the achievement of these key issues.Financial crisis, financial regulation, toxic assets, Bad Bank

Exposures and exposure hedging in exchange rate risk management

Corporations are affected by increasing volatilities on foreign exchange markets. A response to this development was the creation of financial instruments, so called derivatives, in order to protect corporations from the effects of flexible exchange rates. To understand the included risks and to take correct decisions it is necessary to get a fundamental insight into exchange rate risk management. First it is the aim of this paper to systemize the possibilities of determining exchange rate risk as well as objectives of exchange rate risk management. In the second part of the paper a model to determine the optimal hedge ratio in the case of hedging transaction risks with forwards is described. --Currency Risk,Transaction Risk,Currency Forwards,Optimal Hedging

Bad Bank(s) and Recapitalization of the Banking Sector

With banking sectors worldwide still suffering from the effects of the financial crisis, public discussion of plans to place toxic assets in one or more bad banks has gained steam in recent weeks. The following paper presents a plan how governments can efficiently relieve ailing banks from toxic assets by transferring these assets into a publicly sponsored work-out unit, a so-called bad bank. The key element of the plan is the valuation of troubled assets at their current market value – assets with no market would thus be valued at zero. The current shareholders will cover the losses arising from the depreciation reserve in the amount of the difference of the toxic assets’ current book value and their market value. Under the plan, the government would bear responsibility for the management and future resale of toxic assets at its own cost and recapitalize the good bank by taking an equity stake in it. In extreme cases, this would mean a takeover of the bank by the government. The risk to taxpayers from this investment would be acceptable, however, once the banks are freed from toxic assets. A clear emphasis that the government stake is temporary would also be necessary. The government would cover the bad bank’s losses, while profits would be distributed to the distressed bank’s current shareholders. The plan is viable independent of whether the government decides to have one centralized bad bank or to establish a separate bad bank for each systemically relevant banking institute. Under the terms of the plan, bad banks and nationalization are not alternatives but rather two sides of the same coin. This plan effectively addresses three key challenges. It provides for the transparent removal of toxic assets and gives the banks a fresh start. At the same time, it offers the chance to keep the cost to taxpayers low. In addition, the risk of moral hazard is curtailed. The comparison of the proposed design with the bad bank plan of the German government reveals some shortcomings of the latter plan that may threaten the achievement of these key issues.financial crisis, financial regulation, toxic assets, bad bank

Zentrale Gegenparteien für den außerbörslichen Derivatehandel in der Praxis

Die aus der geringen Transparenz und mangelnden Standardisierung des außerbörslichen Derivatehandels resultierenden Gefahren sind durch die internationale Finanzkrise deutlich aufgedeckt worden. Nach dem Willen von Regulierungsbehörden soll diesem bisher weitgehend unregulierten Marktsegment durch den vermehrten Einsatz zentraler Gegenparteien (Central Clearing Counterparties (CCPs)) ein unmittelbarer Ordnungsrahmen gegeben werden. Seit kurzem wird deshalb der Markt für Kreditderivate teilweise zentral abgewickelt. Wie auch bei dem schon länger etablierten Segment für Zinsswaps zeigt sich, dass vor allem ein Anbieter das Abwicklungsvolumen auf sich vereint. Die Arbeit soll die Anbieter zentraler Clearingdienste - am Beispiel von LCH.Clearnet, Eurex und ICE Clear - charakterisieren und diskutieren, welche Faktoren für den Erfolg von CCPs auf Teilmärkten des außerbörslichen Derivatemarktes verantwortlich sind. -- The lack of transparency and standardization of trading derivatives over-thecounter (OTC) is supposed to be one of the reasons of the international financial crisis. Regulators are willing to regulate the OTC-market directly by the increased use of central clearing counterparties (CCPs). Recently, therefore, the market for Credit Default Swaps is cleared centrally and several vendors have already placed their platforms. Primarily one provider processes the clearing volume on this market, which already could be proved for the market of interest rate swaps. The paper characterizes clearing organizations - drawing on the examples of LCH.Clearnet, Eurex and ICE Clear - and discusses factors that are responsible for the success of CCPs on the OTC-market.Zentrale Gegenpartei,Finanzkrise,Clearing,außerbörsliche Derivate,Zinsderivate,Kreditderivate,Credit Default Swaps

Absicherung von Strompreisrisiken mit Futures: Theorie und Empirie

The regulatory changes in the german electric power market result in rising electricity price volatility. As a consequence electricity price risk management is essential for an electricity trader. The paper therefore analyzes the needed volume of futures hedging for an electricity trader, that ist tries to derive the optimal hedge ratio. In the first step the theoretical conditions for a preference-free optimal hedge ratio are discussed. In the second step these conditions are analyzed empirically with data for the german electricity exchange EEX and the scandinavian electricity exchange Nord Pool. --Electricity Price Risk,Electricity Futures,optimal Hedge Ratio